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independent economic value and
Morlife took reasonable efforts to
keep the list secret. The court further
held that Burlingame misappropriated the customer list when it used
the list to solicit former Morlife
customers. Furthermore, the court
upheld the trial court's award of
injunctive and monetary relief.

Concurring Opinion
Questioned Factual
Conclusions and Injunctive
Relief
Judge Haerle concurred with the
majority decision but expressed
reservations about the trial court's

factual conclusions and injunctive
awards. He stated that Perry only
took a collection of customer
business cards, not a "customer list"
or information from the computer
files on restricted access. Haerle
further noted that other former
employees in American Paperand
PackagingProducts Inc. v. Kirgan,
228 Cal. Rptr. 518 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) had done "similar things"
without incurring liability under the
UTSA. Judge Haerle also challenged
the trial court's finding that all of the
customers who transferred their
business from Morlife to
Burlingame had been solicited by
Defendants when only three of the

four former Morlife customers
testified that they were solicited.
However, he conceded that the
appellate court is to defer to the trier
of fact.
In questioning the permanent
duration of the primary injunctive
relief, Judge Haerle agreed with the
Kirgan court that an injunction
should only last as long "as is
necessary to eliminate the commercial advantage that a person would
obtain through misappropriation."
He suggested that the appropriate
time period was satisfied with the
initial injunction of the lower court
which eliminated any advantage
Burlingame had enjoyed.

Eighth Circuit Denies Jaw Implant Recipients Relief
From Dow Chemical
by Wendy K. Davis
In TemporomandibularJoint
Implant Recipients v. Dow Chemical Co., 113 F.3d 1484 (8th Cir.
1997), the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor
of Defendant, Dow Chemical
Company ("Dow Chemical") and
against Plaintiffs, recipients of
silicone-based temporomandibular
joint ("TMJ") implants manufactured by Dow Coming, a subsidiary
of Dow Chemical. Plaintiffs sought
damages from Dow Chemical, a
parent corporation of Dow Coming.
The Eighth Circuit held that: (1) the
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district court did not grant summary
judgment prematurely; (2) Dow
Chemical's preliminary silicone
testing and trademark agreements
with Dow Coming did not constitute
an "undertaking" for purposes of
triggering Dow Chemical's duty of
reasonable care to Plaintiffs; (3)
Dow Chemical did not "aid and
abet" Dow Coming's allegedly
tortious activities; and (4) Dow
Chemical was not liable for fraudulent concealment, fraudulent
misrepresentation, or conspiracy
regarding Dow Coming and the
TMJ implants.

Plaintiffs Allegedly Injured
by Jaw Implants Sue in
Product Liability
The TMJ connects the upper and
lower jaws. Plaintiffs received TMJ
implants, which are surgically
inserted prosthetic devices made in
part of silicone that replace dysfunctional TMJs. Plaintiffs claimed that
their TMJ implants "deteriorated"
after they were implanted, which
caused, among other things, "surrounding jaw bond disintegration,
serious autoimmune responses, and
severe head and neck pain." Plaintiffs sought damages for their
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injuries on the theories of corporate
control and direct liability.
Various Plaintiffs sued both Dow
Chemical and Coming, Inc. ("Coming"), which each own fifty percent
of Dow Coming, The Judicial Panel
on Multi-District Litigation consolidated the cases during the pre-trial
phase. Dow Coming was in bankruptcy, and therefore, did not appear
in the case. Plaintiffs' claim against
Dow Coming was transferred to the
bankruptcy court with jurisdiction
over Dow Coming's case. The
district court ordered summary
judgment in favor of Dow Chemical
and Coming in all of the consolidated cases. Plaintiffs appealed.
Coming was not a party to the
appeal because Plaintiffs appealed
only the direct liability claims, of
which Coming was not a party. The
Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Dow Chemical Involved in
Early Silicone Testing
From 1943 into the 1970s, Dow
Chemical performed several
toxicology tests on several different
silicone compounds. None of these
tests studied whether any of the
silicones were safe for use in
medical implants. Three scientists
employed by Dow Chemical
published two papers, one in 1948
and the other in 1950, both generally
discussing the toxicity of silicones
and certain compounds specifically.
The 1948 paper pointed out hazards
"associated with certain silicone
compounds."
In 1967, one of the scientists
involved in the above mentioned
papers attended a meeting held at
Dow Coming "discussing the
toxicology of various Dow Coming
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products," including dental materials. Though some participants in the
meeting discussed the possibility of
developing a permanent tooth
implant, Plaintiffs provided no
evidence that a Dow Chemical
employee participated in the
discussion, or that any meeting
participants discussed TMJ implants. In 1968, Dow Coming
formed its own toxicology department located on Dow Chemical's
premises and hired a former Dow
Chemical employee to head the
department. The laboratory moved
into a Dow Coming building in
1971.
In 1975, Dow Coming and Dow
Chemical signed standard trademark
licensing agreements, which gave
Dow Coming the use of certain Dow
Chemical trademarks and trade
names. Dow Chemical retained the
right to inspect Dow Coming's
products bearing the trademarks or
trade names in order to protect the
integrity of those trademarks and
trade names.

Plaintiffs Claimed Vicarious
and Direct Liability
In the present case, Plaintiffs
argued that the court should pierce
Dow Coming's corporate veil and
permit the Plaintiffs to sue Dow
Coming's owners - Dow Chemical
and Coming - for Dow Coming's
torts under a corporate control
theory. Alternatively, Plaintiffs
argued that Dow Coming was the
joint venture of Dow Chemical and
Coming, so Plaintiffs could sue
Dow Chemical and Coming directly
for Dow Coming's torts.
However, the court rejected both
of Plaintiffs' arguments. It refused to

pierce Dow Coming's corporate
veil; therefore, neither Dow Chemical nor Coming were liable for the
torts of Dow Coming. Additionally,
the court found that Dow Coming
was not a joint venture of Dow
Chemical and Coming. Thus,
Plaintiffs could sue neither Dow
Chemical nor Coming directly for
Dow Coming's torts.
In addition, Plaintiffs also
claimed that Dow Chemical was
directly liable under several theories.
The district court found no genuine
issue of material fact as to any of
those theories and awarded summary judgment to Dow Chemical.
On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the
district court's grant of summary
judgment was premature, and that
"there are genuine issues of material
fact which preclude a grant of
summary judgment on their claims
of negligent performance of an
undertaking, aiding and abetting
tortious conduct, fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation, and
conspiracy."
Further, Plaintiffs argued that the
district court in this case prematurely granted summary judgment
because it improperly relied on the
factual findings of another case, In
re Breast Implants, 837 F. Supp.
1128, 1142 (N.D. Ala. 1993). In re
Breast Implants was a breast implant
case brought by silicone breast
implant recipients and had legal and
factual issues similar to the present
case. Because of the similarity of the
issues in the two cases, the district
court told Plaintiffs in the present
case to coordinate Plaintiffs'
discovery requests with the discovery process in In re Breast Implants
and to use the information that Dow
Chemical had produced in that case.
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In 1993, the court in the breast
implant case granted Dow Chemical
interlocutory summary judgment.
Dow Chemical then sought summary judgment in the present case
and relied on the court's reasoning
and holding in In re Breast Implants.
On March 31, 1995, the district
court in this case granted Dow
Chemical's summary judgment
motion, but did not enter final
judgment. A month later, the court
in In re Breast Implants vacated its
summary judgment order on
plaintiffs' claim for direct liability,
finding that evidence produced after
the court had entered its summary
judgment order was sufficient to
find Dow Chemical liable to the
plaintiffs for negligence. Specifically, the In re Breast Implants court
found that based on this new
evidence, a jury could find that Dow
Chemical was liable to the recipients
of the breast implants for a negligent
undertaking because of its silicone
testing. Based on this vacated
summary judgment order, Plaintiffs
moved to vacate the district court's
summary judgment order in the
present case. The court, however,
denied Plaintiffs motion and entered
final judgment in favor of Dow
Chemical.
On appeal, Plaintiffs in the
present case argued that the district
court abused its discretion by
denying Plaintiffs' motion to vacate.
Plaintiffs argued that they should not
have had to rely on the discovery in
the breast implant case when the
court in that case later vacated its
summary judgment order. Further,
Plaintiffs argued that because the
district court in the present case
required Plaintiffs to rely on the
discovery from the breast implant
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case, Dow Chemical did not have to
disclose its role in developing and
researching TMJ silicon and did not
have to explain the differences
between breast implant and TMJ
silicones. Therefore, Plaintiffs
argued, the district court should not
have granted summary judgment.
without allowing Plaintiffs further
discovery.
The Eighth Circuit rejected the
Plaintiffs' timing argument, noting
that the district court did not need to
wait until all discovery was complete to enter summary judgment,
but only needed to wait until "the
nonmovant has had adequate time
for discovery." The court noted that
Plaintiffs did not ask the district
court to delay a decision on the
summary judgment motion until
more discovery was completed, as
they could under Federal Rule 56(f).
Indeed, Plaintiffs expressly disavowed any desire to invoke Federal
Rule 56(f) in oral argument before
the district court. Notably, Dow
Chemical wrote a letter to the
district court, a copy of which was
sent to Plaintiffs' counsel, clearly
expressing its "desire to have
[P]laintiffs file a Rule 56(f) motion."
In the view of the court, "Plaintiffs
made a conscious gamble that their
case as presented was sufficient to
avoid summary judgment and
cannot now complain of inadequate
discovery."
It was not until May 25, 1995,
after the court had ruled on the
summary judgment motion but
before it issued final judgment, that
Plaintiffs asked the court to delay
issuing a final ruling until Plaintiffs'
counsel received certain documents
from the Food and Drug Administration. The court found that although

that request may have preserved the
Plaintiffs' timing argument on
appeal, it did not require the district
court to wait to issue final judgment.
In addition, the court found that
those documents were irrelevant to
the Plaintiffs' case against Dow
Chemical and relevant only to the
Plaintiffs' claims against Dow
Coming. According to the court, the
documents would have done nothing
to strengthen the connection
between Dow Chemical and Dow
Coming, the central issue in the case
against Dow Chemical.
There being "thousands of
different silicone, each with varying
characteristics," the court found that
Plaintiffs should not have been
surprised by the need to conduct
discovery to determine and examine
the properties of the particular type
of silicone used in the TMJ implants.
Further, the court found that
Plaintiffs had "mischaracterize[d]"
Dow Chemical's argument and
"unduly minimize[d] the role of the
district court." The court described
Dow Chemical's strategy in using
the earlier favorable breast implant
ruling as analogizing the two cases
as part of a larger body of evidence
presented to the district court. This
use of the earlier case, the court
stated, "does not estop Dow Chemical from pointing out distinctions
between the breast implant case and
the present case" when the In re
Breast Implants court reversed itself.
Further, the court noted that the
district court did not rely heavily on
the breast implant case in granting
summary judgment.
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The Court Rejected
Plaintiffs' Direct Liability
Claims
The court found that no genuine
issues of material fact existed as to
any of the Plaintiffs' direct liability
theories against Dow Chemical.
First, the court rejected Plaintiffs'
negligent performance of an
undertaking claim. The court found
that Dow Chemical assumed no duty
with respect to the TMJ implants,
either through its trademark agreements with Dow Coming or its
general silicone testing for Dow
Coming. After finding no duty, the
court did not address the other
elements of negligent performance
of an undertaking.
Second, the court rejected
Plaintiffs' claim that Dow Chemical
aided and abetted Dow Coming's
allegedly tortious conduct. For
purposes of its aiding and abetting
discussion, the court assumed Dow
Coming's culpability. Plaintiffs
failed to show that Dow Chemical
knew of the hazards of the TMJ
implants or that it knew it was
assisting its subsidiary in a wrongful
act. Plaintiffs were only able to
show that some employees left jobs
at one company to work at the other,
and Dow Chemical subsidiaries sold
some silicone products -- evidence
that the court found insufficient to
show "dissemination" of knowledge
of the hazards of the TMJ implants
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to Dow Chemical. The court found
that Dow Chemical's early general
toxicology tests on silicone compounds for Dow Coming were
insignificant in comparison with the
amount of research Dow Coming
conducted to develop the TMJ
implants. Plaintiffs produced no
evidence that Dow Coming was
"heavily dependent" on Dow
Chemical in developing the implants, or that Dow Chemical knew
Dow Coming was working on the
project. Further, the court found that
Dow Chemical's general desire to
support a subsidiary's endeavors,
without more specific support of the
TMJ project, was not enough to
support an.aiding and abetting case
against Dow Chemical.
Likewise, the court rejected the
Plaintiffs' fraudulent concealment
and fraudulent misrepresentation
claims against Dow Chemical.
Fraudulent concealment required,
inter alia, that the defendant conceal
a material fact or remain silent "in
the face of a duty to speak." Plaintiffs argue that Dow Chemical had a
duty to speak about the hazards of
silicone implants because it "published two articles asserting the
inertness of silicone and subsequently learned that certain silicone
polymers were not inert."
The court found that Dow
Chemical had no duty to Plaintiffs
for two reasons. First, Dow Chemical had no duty to warn Plaintiffs

because it had no relationship with
Plaintiffs. Further, the court noted
that the articles did not state that "all
silicones are inert," but instead
merely asserted that "silicones as a
class are inert."
Second, Plaintiffs did not supply
the court with any evidence of active
concealment. Thus, the court found
that Plaintiffs failed to show that
Dow Chemical concealed anything.
Therefore, the court did not address
the other elements of fraudulent
concealment. Likewise, the court
rejected Plaintiffs' fraudulent
misrepresentation claim against
Dow Chemical because Plaintiffs
failed to show that Dow Chemical
made any false representations.
Last, the court found that
Plaintiffs did not present "evidence
sufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact" as to whether Dow
Chemical conspired with Dow
Coming to conceal and misrepresent
dangers of implanted silicone. The
court found that the Plaintiffs'
evidence was merely speculation,
without evidence, "of a broader
conspiracy encompassing all
silicone products." Accordingly, the
court rejected the last of the Plaintiffs' claims and affirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of Defendants.
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